Investors and their incentives

It is incredibly important to understand the incentives of investors when you are raising money. This used to be fairly easy - you raised money from Venture Capitalists who wanted to see a big return on their investment. The best of these investors were incredibly focused on doing the one thing they did well: investing in technology companies.

The world looks different now. There are a lot of different types of startup investors, each with a different approach to investing and different incentives for doing so. While they’d all prefer not to lose money, the differences in how their incentives and expectations are structured are critical in understanding how to decide whether or not to work with them, how to negotiate with them, and how to interact with them over the lifetime of your relationship.

Below, I've tried to highlight the key motivations and structures of each of the investors you are likely to encounter. While I haven't attempted to catalogue all the ways in which the incentives of investors influence their behavior - sometimes to the detriment of the startup founders - this should work as a starting point to think through those issues.

One big incentive difference that I've chosen not to address here is preferred vs. common shareholders. That creates a whole other set of questions that is out of scope. Assume the investors below will hold preferred shares.

VC Firm
The classic startup investor that is primarily working to achieve returns for the funds they’ve raised from a set of Limited Partners. The partners at these funds are usually paid in two ways: they earn a % of the funds that they’ve raised and they earn a % of the return they make on the total fund from which they invest in you. These firms generally raise further funds based on the performance of earlier investments.

While investors make money off their management fees (the % of what they've raised), the big pay outs only happen when they return a multiple of the total capital raised. Because of how concentrated venture returns are, VCs generally invest only in deals which they believe will return all or most of their returns.

Angel [1]
Usually a wealthy individual who invests their own money in startups. Sometimes these are people that made money through their own startups. Sometimes they are coming from different industries, and sometimes they inherited their wealth. It can be useful to know which category of angel you are talking to.

Angels have become hugely important to early stage startups as the number of companies have grown beyond the financing ability of traditional funds. More importantly, the wide distribution of Angels has materially decreased the access barrier which founders face when raising capital.

There are a lot of different incentives at play for Angels. While many of them are hoping for huge financial returns, many also want to be able to brag about having invested in a hugely successful startup. What's strange is that Angels often just want to brag about investing in startups, regardless of the success of those companies. Investing in startups has become a badge of pride in a lot of circles.

Though most angels invest as a part time activity, there is a wide range in the amount of time and effort they devote to investing. Knowing that they have other things on their minds should change how you approach and interact with them. You also need to understand how experienced they are, the size at which they invest, and how much time and energy they'll actually spend on their investing.

At one end of this spectrum, you'll find angels who are essentially small seed funds. They invest significant amounts of money in startups, and do so frequently. In the best case, these investors have a deep understanding of the companies in which they invest and can be incredibly helpful. These investors understand that they are likely to lose all their committed capital, understand the standard terms and instruments through which startups raise money, and are generally low maintenance.

At the other end of this spectrum, you'll find small, inexperienced investors who just want to invest in startups wherever they find them. These investors will put a small number of small checks into whatever company they can get into. Because they are unfamiliar with how startups work, they are often hard to deal with and incredibly focused on the risk of losing their principal. These are investors you should avoid unless you absolutely need them.

Accelerators are, for the most part, a subset of VC firms where there are professional investors who raise funds from outside parties to invest in startups. They usually fund more companies than classic VC firms, and do so in batches. Similarly to a VC, most accelerators need to demonstrate return to investors to continue to raise funds.

Accelerators also have a non-financial incentive - they need breakout successes to prove that they are providing operational help to companies and actually “accelerating them.”

Syndicates come in a number of different flavors, but are generally groups of angels who come together to invest in a single deal. Usually, these syndicates have a lead who will be your main point of contact. This lead usually puts money at risk for a return and gets some sort of performance fee for the other funds that they bring into the deal.

Watch out for syndicates where the syndicate runner is taking a management fee on funds raised and is encouraging you to raise more money than you think is wise. Also, be careful with syndicates since you don't know ahead of time who will invest in your company, and might find that one of the investors is a direct competitor who just wants some privileged information.

Any and all comers on the internet who pre-order an unbuilt item in the hopes that it will some day get built and be cool/solve a problem. They’re not expecting financial return, but do want regular updates on what’s going on with the project and when they can expect delivery. Hiding problems is a lot worse than transparently failing to deliver.

Family and Friends
While your friends and family are probably hoping to get a huge return from their investment, they’re more likely motivated by wanting you to get a chance to succeed and be happy. They are unlikely to try to negotiate terms, though in contrast you will feel the worst for losing their money. Take money from them if you need it and only after making sure they fully and completely understand that they are likely to lose anything they give you. You also need to be okay with losing all of the money someone you care about gives you. If you don’t think this is true, don’t take money from them because it will likely hurt your relationship.

Family office
These are the private investment vehicles for super high net worth individuals and families. Whereas some individuals invest their own money as angels, those that get to a certain scale often employ staffs of portfolio managers and investment professionals. There are many different structures here. Some family offices are structured like single limited parter hedge funds with a high tolerance for risk, and others are structured more conservatively. Whatever the risk tolerance, the staffs of family offices generally get carry on their investments as well as salary, which introduces some of the incentive dynamics present at VCs.

Generally, these entities are very concerned with not losing their principal. Whereas a VC fund that loses an entire fund will have a hard time raising other funds, a family office that loses all its principal has no recourse for more funds. Generally, if you get an investment from a family office, it will come from a small portion of a portion of an overall investment portfolio.

Corporate investor (direct)
There are a lot of corporations that like to talk about investing in startups. Some of them actually do this, and some do not. When an investment comes directly from the company's balance sheet at the direction of a particular business line, the corporation is usually looking for strategic value from the investment. Most of these companies know that investing in startups is unlikely to change the valuation of the investor.[2]

This means they either want an inside edge to acquire you at some point, or believe that investing in you will help improve their bottom line. They may want to prevent you from selling to competitors in the same space, and may have other confusing and onerous ideas. This is because their incentives are different that those of most startups - they are more concerned with how you can help them than with how they can help you get gigantic.

Corporate investor (venture arm)
While corporate venture arms have some of the misaligned incentives of direct corporates, they generally have a mandate to generate financial returns for the company's balance sheet. This means they act more like VCs, and are typically more conversant with how startups work.

Governments have many reasons for investing in startups. There are many government grants available in various countries that are designed to promote startups as way to increase job growth. There are also government agencies with their own venture funds, generally designed to fund technology that will help the government in the long run.

University endowment
University endowments are similar to family offices, but they represent an endowment. They are designed to produce returns to fund the university over time. These entities do not generally invest in early stage companies except in conjunction with a fund with whom they have a strong relationship.

Seed fund
Seed funds are VC funds that write smaller checks at early stages of companies. They usually have the same incentives and structures.

Hedge fund
Hedge funds are largely unrestricted pools of capital. Traditionally, these were focused on public market investments, though in the last few years have started investing in startups. Generally, they invest in later stages and are looking for returns on capital as they have LPs and similar incentive structures to VC funds.

Mutual fund
These are large pools of capital run by portfolio managers. They don't have LPs, rather they have large groups of retail investors who buy shares in the funds, which capital they can then deploy. These funds only invest in late stage startups, because they need to deploy a lot of capital to have any kind of impact at the portfolio level. These managers are paid based on performance, and often have reporting requirements that cause them to publish their internal marks for private companies. This has caused a lot of consternation lately as Fidelity has been publishing widely oscillating valuations for a number of companies like Dropbox.

Sovereign wealth fund
These are the largest pools of capital in the world, and are essentially very large family offices for entire countries. These funds are large enough to invest in any and all asset classes that the managers believe will produce a return on investment. Like mutual funds, these funds rarely invest directly in startups - they are more likely to invest in funds that do.

In the last few years, however, a number of them have begun to invest directly in startups. While the managers of these funds are generally paid on a performance basis, there are a lot of other complicated incentives in place at certain funds deriving from political requirements. These are pretty hard to parse.

[1] I don't actually love the term Angel as it seems insufficiently precise given the wide range of investors to whom it applies. While it would probably make sense to find other terms for subgroups, the key thing to know is that. Maybe we'll try to rename them down the road.
[2] Yahoo's investment in Alibaba is a rare exception to this rule.

Thanks to Paul Buchheit, Geoff Ralston, Daniel Gackle, and Dalton Caldwell for your help writing this.

Carts without horses

Investing in emerging markets such as India, Kenya, and Nigeria isn’t quite what I naively thought it would be. Before I started, I thought that finding a good company in an emerging market would just mean copying models that worked in developed markets. All I’d have to do is figure out how the business would need to be tweaked for a lower price point, identify the best founders working on the problem in the new market, and invest in them. Any structural difference in the new market would just serve as a barrier to other companies from moving in. In the last few years, though, I’ve learned that while this is one way to invest, it’s unlikely to identify the largest companies that have yet to be built. I now think that the better way to invest in startups in the developing world is to ask “How would you solve a problem if you started fresh with today’s technology?”

This probably seems like an obvious question, and one that founders and investors should be asking themselves with any opportunity. But, one of the more surprising things that I've learned is the degree to which the sequence of technological adoption changes the opportunity set available to startups and how we think about them. This isn't something you can actually see when looking at a single market, it's similar to comparative literature where each pair of markets that you examine in tandem illustrate the differences and gaps.

Credit cards and payments are a good way to illustrate this dynamic. We'll use the US as the base case. The US has an extensive and well established financial system, from trustworthy savings banks to a wide array of credit options to standardized and reasonably secure systems for transferring money. When M-PESA, Kenya's mobile money transfer system launched in 2007, Kenya did not have many of these pieces of infrastructure. What they did have was an unmet need to quickly and safely transfer money over long distances. They also had Safaricom, the largest cellular operator in the country. Not only did Safaricom provide the phones and coverage needed to make transfers possible, their network reached more of the population than the branches of any bank. On top of that, the banks lacked the lobbying power to kill off an upstart that was actually being run by a powerful company.[1]

Contrast this situation with the one faced by companies like Venmo on launching in the US. The foundation of the market is different here, with huge amounts of regulation governing money transfer alongside a fairly sophisticated (if not perfect) system to send money. Mobile money is just a convenience in the US and also faces barriers to widespread adoption from entrenched technologies, user behaviors, and regulations. In contrast, mobile money is a solution to a deep and unmet need in Kenya with a relatively green field from competition, regulation, and behavioral norms.

M-PESA wasn’t a startup that investors had access to, but let’s pretend it was. If those investors had focused on how a payments company would ever make significant revenue given the small size of the average transfer, they would have missed the opportunity to invest in a system that was handling 25% of Kenya’s GNP in 2013!

Something similar is currently playing out in India. Imagine if the first credit cards had been created today, with ubiquitous smartphones, rather than in the late 40s. Instead of serial numbers printed on paper[2], you’d probably have an app tied to your phone and some uniquely verifiable identity token. It would be easier and more efficient to create a vertically integrated system that combined the features of multiple players within the payments stack. This is the situation in India, where there are around 20 million credit cards and 220 million smartphones. Credit and debit cards aren’t a big thing there, which is why payment is so often handled in cash. In fact, they have a Cash on Delivery (COD) rate of close to 80% for goods purchased online[3]. That means that there are opportunities to build startups in India that look like credit card processors in the developed world, but there’s an even bigger opportunity to invent a new way for people to pay, and to own all the pieces.

It probably makes sense to always try to identify the optimal solution to a problem no matter where you are investing. However, finding ideal solutions is harder to do in developed markets because there are layers and layers of infrastructure, technology, and regulation that have gradually built up around most big problems. No matter what approach you take to a problem, those factors will influence how you think about it.[4]

It seems to me that the best investors are those that can most clearly articulate this thought process and hold onto it while accommodating the particulars of a given market. This is the underlying logic for investors who talk about the importance of identifying new platforms, or of catching the next wave. The companies that fit these criteria rewrite the rules of how their markets work by building entirely new foundations of infrastructure and user expectations. By doing so, they unlock the types of huge opportunities that you'd otherwise only expect in a developing world market with a clean slate.

While some great founders may think this way, many of the best simply have a vision of the world as it should exist that’s only possible with what they are making. Rather than trying to work around barriers, these founders either ignore them or are naive about their existence. Either way, they end up building things that others would have deemed too hard or pointless because of all the things other people had done. I think that's why so many great companies start as projects without much attention to commercial relevance.[5] When you start thinking about all the million different things that an existing market imposes on a new idea, it can be enough to stop you in your tracks. That's not to say that great founders ignore the market. What they actually do is react rapidly to what their companies encounter on first contact and move quickly to adjust and get better.

Developing markets are a kind of mirror of the future, or maybe of the present if things had happened differently. As such, they're hugely instructive in understanding the types of companies that can be built, and of the founders who can build them. I think it’s clear that there will be huge startups built in the developing world. More importantly, though, thinking about how and where those startups will occur forces us to think about solving problems from first principles. Starting with a clean slate lets founders and investors think about how to change the world as quickly as possible, rather than incrementing their way forward.

[1] The Economist has a great analysis of M-PESA’s success here: Sorry about the paywall.
[2] I was recently in the office of a Final (, where Aaron Frank showed me a bunch of the early charge and credit cards. They have them in lucite boxes, like really valuable baseball cards, which I thought was really cool.
[3] As crazy as it might seem to hand cash to the UPS driver when he delivers your latest Amazon order, that’s exactly what happens in India (minus UPS and probably Amazon).
[4] There’s an echo here of George Oppen’s belief that it is impossible to actually be objective when writing because of the degree to which bias is ingrained into the subconscious and influences everything we do.
[5] There are, of course, founders who started with full knowledge of the challenges of their market and built huge companies designed to capitalize on existing inefficiencies.

Thanks to Scott Bell, Garry Tan, Geoff Ralston, and Nitya Sharma for your help thinking this through.

Bad Terms

Every startup fundraising process is influenced by the balance of power between the founder and the investor. When the founder has a company that is doing incredibly well, and is being chased by lots of investors, the founder has more leverage. When the founder is inexperienced, or has a company that hasn't yet gotten a lot of traction, the investor has more leverage.

Often, the output of this shifting balance is reflected in the price agreed to by the two sides. It tends to be higher relative to progress when the founder is stronger, and lower when the investor is stronger. When the two sides are equally experienced, the negotiation is usually “fair” in that both sides know what they are agreeing to. Whether or not they are happy with that is another question.

There are, however, situations that arise in which investors take advantage of inexperienced founders and get them to sign terms that are potentially harmful to the company. Investors that do this want more economic upside and know that they can exploit the founder without the founder even knowing what's happening.

How bad terms can hurt

While I've seen a number of examples of this, there's one I saw recently that was particularly bad. An investor got a first time founder to give them a Right of First Refusal (ROFR) for 2.5x their initial investment on any fundraising that that founder subsequently raised prior to an equity financing round. There are a number of bad things there, but the part that makes this even worse is that the investor has 60 days to say yes or no to the ROFR, no matter what the company does.

Imagine the company were to raise $50k on a 4mm cap safe today, and then 500k on an 8mm cap safe in 55 days - which can be a very long time in the life of a startup - the investor could put in 250k at 4mm! This means that the founders of the company cannot adequately plan out their allocations to new investors, figure out how much dilution they'd be taking, or even know how much money they'd raised until 60 days after the last financing. This kind of uncertainty is terrible for founders and for companies. It is a major distraction and complication at a time when the founder really needs to focus and know what's going on.

This isn't just true about early stage rounds. Founders who are really successful at early stages may find themselves raising late stage rounds where they are again inexperienced. This can lead to founders signing terms that seem good or inconsequential at signing, but lead to really bad things down the road. For instance, a number of founders agreed to ratchets as a trade off against higher valuations in late stage rounds. This is fine if everything goes better than planned, but can hurt the company, founders, and earlier shareholders if things don't go as well as hoped.[1]

Some terms to watch out for

It would be hard to make a comprehensive list of all the bad terms out there, but here are some to watch out for: How to avoid bad terms

There's no way to list out all of the bad terms that investors can put into term sheets. There are, however, things that founders can do to stop this badness from hurting them:
  1. Read every word of every financing that you sign. Make sure you understand each clause, and what that clause will do in the future in different scenarios. If there's anything a doc that you don't understand, don't sign the doc until you do understand those things.
  2. Get a lawyer that understands startups. It's important to find someone with experience. Not only can a good lawyer explain what's going on with terms of your agreement, he/she can tell you if those terms are standard. Lawyers can also help you negotiate, though this is usually more relevant in priced rounds.
  3. Be really careful of side letters. If you're using a standard doc, like the YC safe, it's probably already well balanced and understood. When an investor wants a side letter, they want something non-standard. This isn't necessarily bad, but it should make you extra cautious.
  4. Get help from more experienced founders, particularly ones that have seen multiple financings. They'll be able to give you perspective on what makes sense and what you should push on. They may also be able to help you negotiate.
  5. Know that, ultimately, if you are desperate for financing, you may have to accept bad terms. While that's suboptimal, it is ok if you understand what you are agreeing to. It's rare that a single bad term you understand will kill your company, though the aggregate impact of terms you don't understand can materially change your outcome.
Mitigating bad terms

While these steps can help with future fundraising, there are many founders who have already agreed to bad terms (either through necessity or ignorance), and aren't sure what to do about it. This is tough, because it will depend on whether or not the investor inserted the bad term knowing it was bad for the company, or if they thought it wasn't so bad. As a founder, you should find out, and try to remove it. There's no perfect way to do this, but the first step is to ask the investor to get rid of the term. Say that you were talking to your lawyer or friend and that they pointed out that you signed a term you didn't understand. Ask the investor if you can remove it so that you don't have to worry about it. This will get rid of some portion of these bad terms.[2]

If the investor refuses, your options are more limited. If you have a strong network of other investors or advisers, you can ask them to pressure the investor to change. We've done this a number of times for our companies at YC. Remember that startups, and investing in them, is a long term bet. Reputation matters and smart investors - whether or not they are “good” - will know that screwing a company will end up hurting them down the road. You can make clear that you'll let other founders know about the bad terms you signed. An investor can probably sustain this happening once, but if that investor acted badly towards you, they've likely done it to a lot of companies. If many companies start talking about how bad that investor is, the investor will cease to be able to invest in companies and will have to find a new profession.

The investors that force these terms on unsuspecting founders fail to realize that the big outcomes in investing don't come from clever terms, they come from outliers. Even more than that, asking for these terms is a direct signal that the investors isn't a good investor. I'd avoid those investors asking for these terms, and I tell founders to do the same. In fact, inserting bad terms into funding documents is a good way to limit the number of chances investors have to invest in those black swans because adding those terms will destroy their reputations - it's just a question of how long it will take.
[1] Here's a good explanation of how this has actually played out recently:'Ratchets'InShakyMarket.pdf
[2] This will probably only work for early stage rounds and investors. Later stage investors are more hard nosed, and will hew tightly to caveat emptor.

Thanks Geoff Ralston, Andy Weissman, Dalton Caldwell, and David Tisch for your help on this.

Utopia Bets / Apocalypse Bets

I think that it is nearly impossible to figure out the exact changes that new technologies will create in the world. That's problematic because investing in startups is largely about figuring out whether or not a team with a new technology - or application of existing technology - will create a change large enough to support a big new company.

Not only is it hard to figure out what changes will happen, it's hard to figure out what changes will happen over given periods of time and if those changes are good or bad. In fact, it's probably safe to assume that any given technology will create badness over certain periods of time even if the long term impact is highly positive. Computers are a good example of this. During WWII, IBM punch card machines (not quite computers, but getting there) were used by the Nazis to organize aspects of the Holocaust. At the same time, Alan Turing was building the foundation of modern computing to crack Enigma. Internal combustion engines gave us mobility and trade on a previously unimagined scale, but also led to anthropogenic climate change.

Since there's no way to know every change that a piece of technology will produce, I think there are two ways of evaluating what to build and invest in. I think of these as Utopia Bets and Apocalypse Bets. The most extreme example of this dynamic comes from AI. In one framing, AI creates a world in which all of our hard problems are solved and humanity devotes itself to exploration, art, and generally being good. In the other extreme, the AI wipes us out.

I've found that many people like to talk about their Apocalypse Bets. There is something emotionally satisfying about being cynical and painting a dark version of the future. I think one of the reasons people do this is because they don't want to look stupid and they want to hedge against bad outcomes. If you predict something will go well, and it doesn't, not only does a bad thing happen, but, worse, you are humiliated for being wrong! If you predict something will go badly, and it does, at least you were right. If it goes well, your life is better, and everyone forgets about you being wrong.

Certainly, Apocalypse Bets are popular in the public imagination and press these days, as you can see by looking at books and movies where technology gets away from man and destroys us. Turning on the news or reading the paper, you can find any number of talking heads discussing why our love of technology gave us unstoppable pollution, weapons we can't control, and epidemics ready to wipe out half of humanity.

Add into this that whenever the market starts going down or volatility picks up, talk about how much worse everything is going to get becomes more common because people are scared. There are investors that have made a lot of money off betting that things will get much worse, mostly in the form of shorting the market in one way or the other.[1] No matter what the talking points are, though, I've never actually met someone who makes venture investments in Apocalypse Bets, regardless of how bearish they are about everything else.
I think this is because capitalism is a bet on the future. Investing over the long run has a positive expected return because markets believe, overall, that the economy will grow.[2] If you didn't believe this, you'd never invest. If that's true, then I think venture investing is an exercise in optimism.

The whole process of betting on future return is magnified by startups. In startups, the founders and the investors are betting that a small number of people can change the way the world works, and make a lot of money in the process. It seems that most of the changes that founders are trying to create improve the world. I can't think of ever hearing a pitch where the founders argued that the world getting worse would be a net positive for their business. This might be an argument made by arms manufacturers, but I don't know as I've never been pitched by one.

Startups, then, are making Utopia Bets. It is rare to find a founder who argues that their company will, by itself, bring about Utopia[3], but they mostly believe that the aggregate force of technological change is pushing humanity to a much better place.[4] This makes sense, seeing as how spending your life working towards making the world a worse place would be depressing for anyone that isn't a supervillain.

The best investors I know look for Utopia Bets as the direct rationale for investing in a given company. Investors rarely pick a specific solutions which they think will bring about a better future and then finding a company to do that thing. Instead, they'll often start with a question similar to: “In the future, cities will have 40mm people. What needs to be built to make those cities function well?” This leads to branches of sub-questions and hypotheses. The investor would probably need to think about transportation, communications, logistics, etc. Each of those areas gives rise to a potential set of companies, towards which those investors will be receptive.

This thought process can be useful to investors in two ways. On one side, having a distinct view of how the future will be better gives investors a way to publicly talk about what interests them. If they say intelligent things, founders who are thinking about the same ideas will reach out to talk about those problems. Some of those founders will be really good, and may end up building companies which the investors can put money into. There are also many people who have thought deeply about these problems, but didn't think anyone would fund the crazy ideas they had to bring about a better world. When those people come out of the woodwork and build companies, not only would the investor likely the first opportunity to invest, but, even if the investor passed, there's a net good of new interesting ideas being tried in the real world.[5]

The other good thing that happens through this thought process is trickier. Thinking deeply about certain problems can be a really helpful filter when deciding to invest in ideas, but it can also be misleading. On the one hand, thinking deeply about a given set of ideas can help differentiate what is good and what is bad. Conversely, it can also create significant bias towards funding ideas that seem like a perfect Utopia Bet, without considering the founders. From this perspective, any bet is great if it stands even a tiny chance of making the world better.

That usually leads to funding companies that only seem good. It's much better to consider whether or not the founders are actually good and likely to build the company that will help make the Utopia Bet come true. You can get a read on this by working through how deeply those founders have thought through the idea as it relates to the way the world is going to change. In fact, the best Utopia Bets are about the founders and their views on how the world will change, rather than the a priori assumptions of the investor. These a priori assumptions can actually end up creating throwing false negatives,[6] because the best companies often exploit something in the market that outside experts have dismissed as non-viable.

This fits well with the idea that the best founders should know far more about what they're making, and be far more passionate about it, and be thinking far more originally about it, than anyone else. These founders should continually upend how the investor thinks and the investor should be learning more from the founder than vice versa. If an investor actually knows more about the idea, and is so passionate about it, that investor should build the company!

Founders who find investors whose view of the future echo - but doesn't mirror - their own end up in a relationship that is far more collaborative than those who take money from investors motivated only by returns. When looking for investors, it's important for founders to understand what sort of Utopia Bets individual investors want to make, because it will help frame the conversation and create a real dialogue in which both sides learn. That's a far more effective route to raising money than one sided pitching.

This isn't to say that the relationships formed through this process will always be smooth. In fact, when two people with strongly held visions of the future get together, every difference in that vision can lead to conflict. However if both sides are truly pulling for making the future better, they should be able to find a way forward together to build incredible things.


[1] John Paulson ( almost $5B off of one set of linked bets against the rising housing market. George Soros “broke the pound” in 1992: That felt like an apocalyptic bet, but it also may have helped UK break a recession. He also then bet on the Pound and made more money! (thanks for the info, Elad!) I see these bets as different than shorting a company because of their basis on big macro trends.

[2] This isn't true of short term trades where investors are often betting against temporary pricing imperfections. That reflects a different kind of optimism - confidence that you are smarter than markets.

[3] Though I've met one or two. They're either crazy, working on AI, or both.

[4] Bill Gates talks about this quite a bit, and links it back to his and Paul Allen's original vision for computers:

[5] We've actually noticed both of these trends in response to our Requests for Startups

[6] False negatives are one of the scariest mistakes that investors can make because of the way returns in VC are dominated by the outliers. See:

Thanks to Andy Weissman and Elad Gil for helping me think about this.

Don't focus on the NASDAQ

While thinking about wiggles (Ignoring the Wiggles ), I looked at when the biggest tech cos in the world started relative to NASDAQ. At first, I thought I'd find no correlation between how well the index was doing and when successful companies were founded.

I love looking at this in chart form, which shows just how many market moves these companies have weathered as they've grown.


I was actually surprised to discover that most of the companies on my list were founded while the market was doing relatively well on a trailing 1, 3, and 12 month bases.

Of course, if the founders of Microsoft, Google, and Cisco had looked at the returns of the NASDAQ in the year leading up their decisions to start their companies, we wouldn't have three of the most successful companies in history. I'm glad they didn't stare at the market wiggles.

There's also an important lesson in here for me as an investor. It's easy to get excited about startups when startups are doing well and when the economy is roaring. It's harder to be as excited when public markets are down and I'm seeing flat and down rounds. The easy sounding lesson to draw is usually along the lines of being aggressive when others are fearful, and conservative when others are aggressive.

But I don't actually think that's right, I think the right answer is to ignore everything else and judge founders and their companies on their fundamentals. That seems clean and easy in principle, but is difficult to put into practice because one of the things investors do is make a bet on the paths of markets over time. When markets seem to be saying bad things about the future, and market pricing is a bet on the future, it can be tough to ignore them or bet explicitly against them. If markets are exuberant, it's almost as difficult to be confident that you're paying an appropriately high price or investing in an actual good company. It takes time to form that confidence on the basis of fact rather than just guessing and justifying it later. I'm still working on that.

[1] Data is from Scale is log.